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2| Vasileios Karakasis 
 
Crisis as a constant 
 
The outcome of the European elections indicated an impressive rise of protest parties critical 
of the current status quo in Brussels. More specifically, Eurosceptic (that reject the EU project 
and establishment in general) and Euro-critical (that question the current bureaucratic and 
political status quo in Brussels) parties having various “flavors”, from Austria, France, Britain, 
Greece and Denmark gained a foothold in the European Parliament. The international media 
used the buzzword “earthquake” to capture these results. If someone follows the numbers, 
they would disagree with this catchy narrative since the majority of the seats has been gained 
by the so-called pro-EU parties.  
 
Adding to this, European Parliament elections have been always considered a tailor-mode 
environment for a protest vote, since they provide voters with the opportunity to signal a firm 
message against the EU institutions’ or the government parties’ policies without running the 
risk of having an ideologue directly put into a position of power.  
 
Furthermore, the pro-EU parties feel relieved by the significant ideological (left-wing and right-
wing) dividing lines within the Eurosceptic and the Euro-critical parties. These dividing lines are 
likely to impede the capitalization of this “anti-EU stance” into an integrated single voice. In 
other words, the ideological divisions – attributed to the protest parties, critical of (the current 
status of) the EU – might hinder the delivery of a united, concrete and politically viable “anti-EU 
message”. Thus, the pro-EU parties consider that the current outcome cannot fundamentally 
reshape the political landscape in the EU. 
 
Nevertheless, this optimistic picture might become subject to further questioning in the near 
future. This assumption moves beyond the political momentum that the protest parties have 
gained in these elections. In 2005, the citizens of France and The Netherlands had registered 
their non-acceptance on the EU constitution during the respective referenda. The reason why 
they did this should have already become an issue of a more profound study (or concern) for 
the EU officials. Legitimacy is here the keyword. In a period of increasing EU integration, the 
EU takes daily decisions with an enormous impact on the lives of its citizens. However, these 
decisions fall short of the proper transparency. There are many EU citizens who strongly 
believe that non-elected Brussels’ officials adopt a mix of technocracy intertwined with 
lobbying and intergovernmental negotiation to come up with their policy proposals.  
 
Unfortunately, transparency, political responsibility and an attentive approach to the 
particularities reflecting each member’s idiosyncrasy and sensitivities have been left 
aside. Bearing this in mind, the European Parliament, being the only EU supranational body 
whose members are directly elected by the citizens – even after the ratification of the Lisbon 
Treaty – looks relatively weak when compared to the European Commission (whose members 
are mainly appointed by the governments) and the Council (the governments of the member 
states). Thus, due to constitutional constraints, the only elected EU body does not have a 
strong say in the lives of the EU citizens although the people have provided it with the 
legitimacy to do so. Thus, the low turnout in the European Elections as well as the vote of 
disapproval should not take us by surprise. 
 
Another challenge is closely related to the efficiency of the EU in cracking the crisis down. The 
concept of crisis, in general, emerges when shared values and meanings, which previously 
served a community well, break from the reality of a particular situation. In our case, the 
particular situation is the economic turbulence, the recession and the consequent 
unemployment that have hit a majority of the EU citizens.  
 
Nevertheless, what we are facing in Europe is not a particular situation. After six consecutive 
years of discussions, blame-games, austerity-laden policies and pointing fingers over the 
economic turbulence – along with its socio-economic-security-cultural effects – in our region 
and how it should be handled, the EU has reached a point where ‘crisis’ has been established 
as a constant rather than an exceptional and temporary situation for Europe in its entirety. The 
size of the unemployment rate in the EU in general, seems reluctant to decrease while youth 
unemployment has reached extremely dangerous records in the Mediterranean countries.  
 
The whole situation has been sharply exacerbated by the hugely augmenting influx of 
immigrants and refugees especially in the EU periphery states, emanating mainly from 
countries suffering from unrest (like Libya, Egypt, Syria, Somalia, Sudan, Afghanistan, 
Pakistan etc). As a consequence, people within certain EU member states are incapable even 
of fulfilling basic humanitarian needs since they struggle to put food on their table, heat their 
houses and provide for basic health care. Thus, the image of the EU and the Eurozone has 
been eroded since both have become synonymous to austerity-driven measures and the 
existing poverty.  
 
To the extent EU officials and leaders prove to be incapable of pragmatically echoing and 
addressing these issues, the support for the European institutions will follow a downward 
trend. The results of the EU elections signaled a loss of trust in the current European political, 
institutional and monetary edifice. If the EU leaders do not carefully read into the reasons of 
these results and do not draw the proper lessons, they might encounter even bigger surprises 
in the 2019 elections. 
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